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Comments
Medical Malpractice by Emergency
Physicians and Potential Hospital
Liability*
INTRODUCTION
As early as 1957, courts began to recognize the evolution of
modern hospital services. In a 1957 landmark decision, Bing v.
Thunig,' the New York Court of Appeals stated that "[p]resent-
day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates,
do far more than furnish facilities for treatment.' '2 This evolu-
tion was not ignored by the courts. They began to re-evaluate
their traditional legal analysis regarding hospital liability and
physician malpractice.3 The factors cited to distinguish modern
day hospitals from those of the past included salaried physicians,
support, and administrative staffs. 4 In addition, hospitals charge
patients for medical care and treatment and resort to legal meas-
ures to enforce collection of patient debts incurred during hos-
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Richard Ausness,
Richard Underwood and Mary Ann Cooper M.D., FACEP for their guidance in prepar-
ing this Comment.
143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
Id. at 8. "The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead
simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact."
Id.
'Id.
" Id.
In recent years, courts and legislatures throughout the country have come
to realize that the traditional legal analyses of these relationships accord
with neither contemporary realities nor societal needs. The result has been
increased recognition of a duty owed by hospitals to their patients with
respect to the quality of medical care offered, even in the absence of a
master-servant relationship between the physician and the hospital.
Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Physician Malpractice, 15 Aiuz. L.
Ray. 953, 953-54 (1973).
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pitalization.5 Hospitals no longer simply shelter patients while
independent physicians render medical treatment. 6
Hospitals are complex institutions in which numerous indi-
viduals provide a myriad of services. During any hospital en-
counter a variety of highly skilled individuals could attend to a
patient. Many patients commence a hospital stay with a visit to
the emergency department,7 which typically functions as a "feeder
system" to the inpatient services.8 Many patients are admitted
directly to the hospital for inpatient care after receiving treat-
ment in the emergency department. 9 Many other patients' only
contact with the hospital is emergency department care.' 0 In view
' 143 N.E.2d at 8.
6 Id. "We have no doubt that in a modern hospital a patient is quite likely to
come under the care of a number of persons in different types of contractual and other
relationships with each other." Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944).
"The emergency department, recognized as one of the hospital's more complex,
crucial, and changeable services, is now regarded as a major rather than an ancillary
service." Pegalis & Wachsman, Emergency Room Negligence, TRIAL, May 1980, at 50.
The emergency department has been defined as
... the facilities and services provided primarily for the management of out-
patients coming to the hospital for treatment of conditions determined clin-
ically or considered by the patient or his representative to require immediate
medical care in the hospital environment. The term is to be interpreted as
synonymous with such terms as emergency room, accident room, and casualty
room.
Id. (Quoting AmPacAN HosPITAL AssOCIATION, EMERGENCY SERVIcEs: THE HosPrTAL
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT IN AN EMERGENCY CARE SYsTEM (1972)).
1 For many hospitals, especially large urban facilities, the emergency department
is the portal of entry for patients in need of medical treatment. This is especially true
for indigent patients who do not have private physicians.
9 Often a significant percentage of hospital admissions come from the emergency
department. See generally Ranseen & Thornton, The Emergency Department: A Financial
Winner for Hospitals in the 1980's?, 15 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGM T., Jan. 1985, at 31, 35.
Twenty to 90% of a hospital's admissions may come through the emergency department.
In private hospitals where most patients are admitted on an elective basis, only 20% of
the hospital's admissions come from the emergency department. In inner city general
hospitals where patients are almost exclusively admitted through the emergency depart-
ment, approximately 90% of the patients are admitted through the emergency depart-
ment. Telephone interview with Mary Ann Cooper M.D., FACEP Research Director,
Division of Emergency Medicine, University of Illinois (Mar. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Cooper
Interview].
30 Emergency departments often gauge the "acuity" or severity of the caseload
seen in the department by the percent admitted after the visit. This ranges from a low
of 10% in departments that see many rechecks and serve as private physicians clinics
on the weekend, to an overall average of 16-24% to as much as 40-50% in inner city
county hospitals with active "knife and gun clubs" and sick elderly population. Cooper
Interview, supra note 9.
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of the importance of emergency medical treatment and the public
policy interest in promoting provider responsibility, this Com-
ment examines current trends in hospital liability for emergency
care provided by hospital emergency departments."
This Comment examines several theories of hospital liability,
current case law applying these theories, and the resulting effect
on hospitals. This Comment concludes that current trends in
determining hospital liability for medical malpractice in the
emergency department sufficiently reflect the role of modern
hospitals and individuals providing medical treatment.
I. TiroRrs OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE
The relationship between the emergency physician and the
hospital is an important factor in determining whether the hos-
pital will be liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
for the alleged negligence of an emergency physician. Three types
of physicians work in the emergency department: salaried, pri-
vate, and contract physicians. Salaried physicians are compen-
sated directly by the hospital and are considered employees of
the facility.' 2 Private physicians are independent contractors for
whom the hospital provides the necessary support personnel,
equipment, and facilities to assist in the rendering of patient
care. " Contract physicians have entered into a contractual rela-
" Hospital emergency services are of growing importance. One commentator re-
marked, "[t]hat 'the public has taken to the emergency department like a duck to water'
is certainly no exaggeration, it may be an understatement." Powers, Hospital Emergency
Service and the Open Door, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1455, 1455-56 (1968) (quoting Blalock,
Emergency Care, 40 Hosp. 1966, at 51, 51).
It is quite clear, then, that the public considers the emergency room to be
a community medical center. It is the only place where the best equip-
ment and facilities and at least some care are available on any day, at any
hour, and without appointment. It does not require the presence of the
sometimes unavailable family doctor. In fact, one explanation for this
development is undoubtedly the concurrent disappearance of the traditional
family doctor and the house call, and the advent of the clinic, regular
office hours and doctors' days off.
Id. at 1457.
See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 70-111 and accompanying text.
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tionship with the hospital to provide a specific service. 14 These
physician/hospital relationships and the current theories of hos-
pital liability for negligent acts of these physicians are analyzed
separately.
A. The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior, or "let the master answer,"' 15 refers to
the "area within which a master is liable for the torts of servants
which, although committed disobediently, are connected with
the service of the employer.' ' 6 Respondeat superior has been
used effectively in various industries to hold employers liable
for the acts of negligent employees. 7 Courts in the past, how-
ever, were reluctant to hold hospitals liable for the negligent acts
of medical personnel not directly employed by them., This
reluctance was due to the independent contractor status of most
hospital physicians. 19 "Even though [physicians were] employed
by the hospital, they were to be regarded as independent con-
tractors rather than employees because of the skill they exercised
and the lack of control executed over that work. ' '20 Conse-
quently, a body of case law developed premising hospital liability
for patient injuries caused by employee negligence upon whether
the injury-producing act was administrative or medical in na-
ture.21 The courts found substantial difficulty in differentiating
" See infra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.
" BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
16 W. SEAvEy, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 83 (1964).
17 See Atlanta Commercial Builders, Inc. v. Polinsky, 250 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1978) (construction industry); Peeples v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 603 P.2d
765 (Or. 1979) (motorcycle industry).
18 See Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for
Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385, 396-97 (1975).
19 Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGAL
MED. 1, 8 (1983).
20 Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 6 (N.Y. 1957).
2, Id. at 4. See Berg v. New York Soc'y for Relief of Ruptured & Crippled, 136
N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1956) (administering wrong blood to the right patient is medical);
Sutherland v. New York Polyclinic Medical School & Hosp., 82 N.E.2d 583 (N.Y. 1948)
(keeping a hot water bottle on a patient too long is medical); Necolayff v. Genesee
Hosp., 73 N.E.2d 117 (N.Y. 1947) (administering blood, by means of a transfusion, to
the wrong patient is administrative); Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Medical School &
Hosp., 68 N.E.2d 450 (N.Y. 1946) (placing a hot water bottle on a patient's body is
administrative).
[Vol. 75
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between medical and administrative acts.22 Quite appropriately,
this distinction eventually gave way to a more reasonable anal-
ysis. The Bing court stated that
[h]ospitals should ... shoulder the responsibilities borne by
everyone else. There is no reason to continue their exemption
from the universal rule of respondeat superior. The test should
be ... [whether] the person who committed the negligent
injury-producing act [was] one of its employees and, if he was,
was he acting within the scope of his employment. 23
Sound policy reasons for holding hospitals accountable under
respondeat superior now exist. 24 To limit its liability, the hospital
will implement and enforce policies and procedures which sig-
nificantly control the employee's activities. 2 When a negligent
act is committed, possibly both the employee and hospital will
be sued. Hospitals generally are insured more adequately and
are in a superior financial position to compensate the victim.
Under this analysis, public policy would seem to indicate that
the institution should be held responsible for the negligent acts
of its employees.
Courts eventually developed a two-prong test to determine
whether a hospital was liable for the acts of physicians or other
medical personnel. 26 The first part of the test queries whether
12 The Bing court felt that this distinction had long plagued the judicial system.
Consistent and clearly defined distinctions between administrative and medical actions
were elusive. Distinctions set forth in other decisions provided neither guiding principles
nor clear delineation of policy. These decisions only caused confusion and created doubt
and uncertainty. 143 N.E.2d at 4, 5.
1, Id. at 8.
24 See Southwick, supra note 19, at 4.
1- Hospitals maintain extensive policy and procedure manuals covering numerous
activities of hospital employees. Moreover, hospitals maintain a Risk Management func-
tion which seeks to limit potential problems before they occur. See generally JOINT
CoMMIssIoN ON ACCREDITATION OF HOsPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosPITALS
(1987).
11 Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 975 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
The seminal case that held a hospital vicariously liable for negligence or malpractice of
staff physicians, irrespective of the contractual arrangement between them, was Brown
v. Lasociet Francise de Bienfiasance Mutuelle, 71 P. 516 (Cal. 1903). See also Kober v.
Stewart, 417 P.2d 476 (Mont. 1966). The Kober court patterned its decision after Brown
and reversed a summary judgment favoring the hospital, finding there was genuine issue
of fact as to whether the hospital would be vicariously liable for the acts of the X-ray
clinic technicians. The court listed several reasons for its decision including: the fact that
1986-87]
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the patient sought treatment from the hospital as opposed to a
particular doctor. 27 The second part of the test examines whether
the hospital paid the doctor a salary.28 Using this test, "courts
can more accurately determine where responsibility for malprac-
tice lies and decide whether the hospital should share in the
liability."2 9 In short, changing circumstances regarding medical
care and hospital services have encouraged courts to expand the
doctrine of respondeat superior by finding employment relation-
ships in situations where several decades earlier none would have
been found.30
B. The Doctrine of Ostensible Agency
"Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations
of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly
as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the
other's manifestations to such third persons.' 'a3 Normally, an
employer is not vicariously liable for the torts of an employee
who is an independent contractor.12 This principle frequently has
no one requested the services of the particular radiologist, the radiologists rotated their
periods of service at the hospital, a hospital employee requested that the radiologist read
the X-rays, the radiologist was on call, calling its own radiologist was the hospital's
standard procedure, the hospital owned and operated the equipment and sent one bill
including the doctor's fee, and the clinic received a percentage of the gross profits. Id.
at 479-80.
" 579 P.2d at 975.
2 Id.
'9 Note, Theories for Imposing Liability Upon Hospitals for Medical Malpractice:
Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liability 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 561, 572 (1985).
30 See Southwick, supra note 19, at 7.
Among the changing circumstances surrounding the practice of medicine
that have encouraged the courts to expand the applicability of respondeat
superior are these: to an increasing extent, patients no longer select their
own private physician-rather, the hospital, an employer, or some other
third party furnished or provides a doctor; patients use the hospital emer-
gency room more frequently indeed, it is not uncommon for a private
physician to tell the patient to go to the emergency room on weekends or
whenever the doctor is off-duty; hospital and other corporate institutions
that provide medical care have increased the number and the frequency of
salaried arrangements for physicians; medical practice has become increas-
ingly institutionalized and specialized; and, contracts with hospital based
specialists have dramatically increased in number and frequency.
Id.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965).
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been used to "effectively insulate hospitals from liability for a
private physician's or independent contractor's negligent acts,
no matter how gross the negligence. '3
Because many jurisdictions became dissatisfied with the abil-
ity of hospitals to contract away their liability, courts began to
recognize an agency relationship when a principal erroneously
led a third party to believe that another was the principal's
agent. 34 In Seneris v. Haas,35 the court pointed out that three
things must be proved for a patient to recover damages against
a principal for alleged acts of an ostensible agent. First, the
person dealing with the agent must do so with the reasonable
Adams, Kentucky Law Survey-Torts 73 Ky. L.J. 483, 504 (1984-85).
Several jurisdictions recognize ostensible agency as applied to hospitals and
emergency room physicians. See Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hosp., Inc., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970); Irving v. Doctors
Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Paintsville Hosp.
Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985); Mehlman v. Powell, 378 A.2d 1121 (Md.
1977); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985); Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran
Charity Bd., 637 P.2d 155 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430
A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Edmonds v. Chamberlain Memorial Hosp., 629 S.W.2d
28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). See also Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 447 (N.J.
1979). The Arthur court recognized that most people have limited knowledge of those
working in emergency rooms:
This court may take judicial notice that generally people who seek medical
help through the emergency room facilities of modern-day hospitals are
unaware of the status of the various professionals working there. Absent
a situation where the patient is directed by his own physician or where the
patient makes an independent selection as to which physicians he will use
while there, it is the reputation of the hospital itself upon which he would
rely.
Id. Mbuda v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) ("Pa-
tients entering the hospital through the Emergency Room, could properly assume that
the treating doctors and staff of the hospital were acting on behalf of the hospital. Such
patients are not bound by secret limitations as are contained in a private contract
between the hospital and the doctor."); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970,
974 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978). The Adamsk court noted the insufficiency of the traditional
rules of agency:
The experience of the courts has been that application of hornbook rules
of agency to the hospital-physician relationship usually leads to unrealistic
and unsatisfactory results, at least from the standpoint of the patient.
Consequently, we have seen a substantial body of special law emerging in
this area; the result has been an expansion of hospital liability for negligent
medical acts committed on its premises.
Id.
" 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955).
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belief in the agent's authority. 6 Second, such belief must be
generated by some act or neglect of the principal.37 Finally, the
third person, relying on the agent's apparent authority, must not
be negligent.3 8
The application of this principle can be demonstrated in the
context of a hospital emergency department where physician
coverage is provided by an independent group of physicians
under contract with the hospital. In this setting, patients typically
receive treatment from physicians under the belief that the phy-
sicians are hospital employees. This belief frequently occurs be-
cause the hospital fails to notify the patient of the contractual
relationship between the treating physician and the hospital.
Ostensible agency concepts can be applied when the patient
reasonably relies on this belief, negligence occurs, and the patient
was not negligent.
C. Corporate Liability
"The doctrine of hospital corporate liability developed largely
because traditional regulatory means failed to detect and disci-
pline incompetent physicians." 39 "Under this doctrine a court
holds a hospital's governing body4° liable for the negligence of
a private staff physician if the hospital fails to properly screen
and supervise him." ' 41 This expansion of liability has been jus-
tified for several reasons. First, the expanded role of hospitals
as health care providers warrants an increase in the scope of
their liability. 42 Second, the expansion of hospital liability pro-
36 Id. at 927.
37 Id.
38 Id.
31 Note, Reallocating Liability to Medical Staff Review Committee Members: A
Response to the Hospital Corporate Liability Doctrine, 10 AM. J. LAW & MED. 115,
117 (1985).
40 Id. The Board of Governors has ultimate authority for overseeing the proper
maintenance and functioning of the hospital. The duties and responsibility of the Board
are delineated in the Joint Commission's Accreditation Manual. This document, pub-
lished annually by the national accrediting body, also contains a chapter on emergency
services which provide a judicially recognized standard for the hospital's emergency
facilities. See Jonrr CoNssON ON ACCREDrTATION OF HosprTAs, ACCREDrrATION MANuAL
FOR HosPrrALs (1987).
4, Note, supra note 39, at 116.
42 Id. at 121.
[Vol. 75
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vides hospitals with a financial incentive to monitor the quality
of medical care given by their staff members.4 3 Third, the doc-
trine of respondeat superior has been unsatisfactory as a basis
for holding hospitals liable for the negligence of their staff
members 4 The use of the corporate liability doctrine has been
somewhat controversial and is the focus of many commentators
and courts. 45
Corporate liability and ostensible agency theories increasingly
have been used to hold hospitals liable for the actions of negli-
gent physicians. 46 If an employer/employee relationship between
the hospital and physician is absent, hospital liability will rest
upon application of one of these theories. This, in effect, pre-
vents the hospital from escaping liability for negligent acts of
contract physicians functioning in the emergency department. 47
II. CASE LAW
A. Hospital Liability for Salaried Physicians
"Hospital staff physicians include those physicians who,
through agreement with the hospital governing board, admit
patients to the hospital." 4 Typically, these physicians are con-
sidered employees of the hospital and are directly compensated
for their services by the hospital. 49 Initially, courts used the
doctrine of respondeat superior to hold hospitals liable for the
acts of salaried physicians." Under this doctrine, the essential
factor in determining hospital liability was the degree of control
4' Id.
See Note, supra note 29, at 564-66.
41 See, e.g., Trail & Claybrook, Hospital Liability and the Staff Privileges Di-
lemma, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 315 (1985).
', See infra notes 70-146 and accompanying text.
47 See generally SOUTHWcK, supra note 19.
41 See Note, supra note 39, at 121.
' Id.
Under the theory of vicarious liability, an employer can be held liable for the
negligence of an employee even though the employer had nothing to do with the
occurrence of the negligent act. The employer's liability is based on the ability of the
employer to control the activities of the employee. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §
69, at 458 (4th ed. 1972). See also W. PAoE KETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984); supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
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that the hospital exercised over the physician.-" When the hos-
pital significantly controlled the activities of the physician, lia-
bility could be imputed to the institution.5 2
The case law with respect to physicians who are hospital
employees is well settled. Hospitals, like other employers, have
been held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for the negligence of employee physicians.5 3 One recur-
rent issue in this area, however, is the employer/employee status
of resident physicians.54 Resident physicians are currently the
most frequently encountered hospital employee physician.-- There
5, An important factor to be considered in determining the status of one who
performs services for another is the right of the latter to control the former. REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). One commentator has noted that in some jurisdictions
the courts, in ascertaining whether the hospital rightfully controls the employee, look to
the nature of the acts performed and the custom regarding the control ordinarily exercised
in the performance of similar acts. See Rodriguez v. City and County of Denver, 702
P.2d 1349, 1350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
52
The courts generally look to all of the facts and circumstances to determine
if the hospital and doctor enjoy such a "significant relationship" that the
rule of respondeat superior ought to apply. When ... the hospital under-
takes to provide medical treatment rather than merely [serve] as a place
for the physician to [treat] patients, the physician employed to deliver that
service for the hospital may be looked upon as an integral part of the total
"hospital enterprise."
Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 975 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). See
Overstreet v. Doctors Hosp., 237 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
11 Brown v. Lasociet Francise de Bienfiasance Mutuello, 71 P. 516 (Cal. 1903),
produced the so called "Brown formula" which courts regularly use to hold hospitals
liable for the negligent acts of their interns and resident physicians. See, e.g., Garfield
Memorial Hosp. v. Marshall, 204 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Bowers v. Olch, 260 P.2d
997 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953); (City of) Miami v. Oates, 10 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1942);
Moeller v. Hauser, 54 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1952); James v. Holder, 309 N.Y.S.2d 385
(N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Koubeck v. Fairview Park Hosp., 172 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio 1960);
Sepaugh v. Methodist Hosp., 202 S.W.2d 985 (Tenn. 1947); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp.
v. Curry, 3 S.E.2d 153 (Va. 1939); Brant v. Sweet Clinic, 8 P.2d 972 (Wash. 1932).
14 As a result of the numerous training programs for physicians and the need for
physician coverage in the emergency department, residents often are employed by private
hospitals.
11 Resident physicians typically are affiliated with university accredited programs
based in publicly-owned facilities. Quite often these facilities receive governmental im-
munity under state and federal torts claims acts. Many times resident physicians rotate
through private institutions that do not enjoy the same immunity from prosecution for
medical malpractice. When the physician is rendering care in these facilities, there is
potential for liability of the site hospital. See Malpractice in the Emergency Department:
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are numerous medical residency programs in emergency medicine
and other areas of specialization.56 Moreover, many medical
school programs require a resident physician to perform medical
services in the emergency department even though their specific
training is focused in a different medical specialty. Much of the
controversy surrounding resident physicians and hospital liability
involves the element of control over resident physicians.57 To
establish hospital liability under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, the hospital must have exercised sufficient control over
the resident physician.
In Kelly v. Rossi," the disputed issue was whether the resi-
dent physician was the servant of the city hospital while on
rotation and working in the emergency room of a private hos-
pital.59 The physician's defense was based on her employment
by the city of Boston as a house officer at Boston City Hospital.
As a Boston City Hospital employee, she claimed she could not
be held liable for medical malpractice under the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act.'0 Further, the private hospital where the alleged
malpractice occurred did not maintain the requisite element of
control and, therefore, would not be vicariously liable.6 '
Review of 200 Cases, 13 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 709, 709 (Sept. 1984).
[Tihe surgical specialties accounted for most ... of the claims. Sixty-four
(32%) were attributable to house officers apparently functioning in a
nonsupervised capacity, or to residents on rotation from specialty training
or moonlighting in an unsupervised capacity .... The relatively high risk
for moonlighting residents has been confirmed recently by the 13 hospitals
in the Harvard group practice.
Id. at 710.
." In 1972, there were only two residency-trained emergency physicians. By 1978,
there were 336 and in 1983, there were approximately 1,000. By 1975, there were 31
emergency medicine residency programs. A Longitudinal Study of Residency-Trained
Emergency Physicians, 12 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 20, 20 (Jan. 1983). Since 1980,
when Emergency Medicine was approved as a specialty, there have been 4,250 board
certified physicians. Approximately 2,600 physicians have completed the program to
date. Currently there are 67 approved residency programs graduating approximately 450
emergency physicians each year. Cooper interview, supra note 9.
' See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
481 N.E.2d 1340 (Mass. 1985).
Id.
The court indicated that they normally looked to the federal courts' treatment
of the Federal Torts Claim Act in applying the Massachusetts State Torts Claim Act. In
this situation, however, Congress' intent to exempt certain physicians from liability while
working for the government was not clear. Id. at 1343 n.4.
" Id.
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"The legal principles that govern the determination of whether
a doctor [is] a public employee ... are the same as those that
have determined whether an agent is a servant for whose negli-
gent acts a principal may be liable under ... respondeat supe-
rior."' 6 The court noted that the guiding principle in determining
vicarious liability is whether or not the hospital has the right to
control the agent's activities. 6 While case law exists that stands
for the proposition that a physician is not a servant when a
hospital cannot control the details of a physician's activity, 64 the
general rule is that house officers are servants of the hospital.6 5
The Kelly court focused on the physician's activities in the
emergency department to determine whether the physician was
a servant of the hospital or subject to the control and direction
of the city.6 6 The doctor, when working in the emergency de-
partment, was required to follow the policies and procedures
established by the hospital. 67 Moreover, she could not admit
patients and did not have a choice in which patients she could
see s.6  Generally, the physician's activities were controlled by
Id. at 1342.
63 "The right to control an agent's activities has been the guiding principle in
deciding cases involving an assertion of vicarious liability against the agent's principal."
Id.
The relationship of principal and agent or master and servant is distin-
guished from the relationship of employer and independent contractor by
the following test: Did the employer retain control of, or the right to
control, the mode and manner of doing the work contracted for? If he
did, the relationship is that of principal and agent or master and servant.
If he did not but is interested merely in the ultimate result to be accom-
plished, the relationship is that of employer and independent contractor.
Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (quoting
Councell v. Douglas, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955)).
See generally Overstreet v. Doctors Hosp., 237 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
65 481 N.E.2d at 1343. A house officer, such as a resident, has duties and obli-
gations at a hospital that demonstrate that he or she is a servant.
66 Id.
6, The facts in this case indicated that "[d]uring the day the doctor worked with
and studied developmental pediatrics under a doctor on the staff of the hospital. [Several
nights] during the week she was assigned to emergency room duty at the hospital pursuant
to a schedule established at the Boston City Hospital." Id. at 1344. Record keeping and
administrative responsibilities were also to be conducted according to hospital policy. Id.
61 "She could neither admit nor discharge a patient without the permission of a
physician designated by the hospital." Id.
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hospital policy. Therefore, the court concluded that the doctor
was a servant of the hospital and not the city.69
B. Hospital Liability for Private Doctors
The courts have used several theories of liability to hold
hospitals liable for the negligence of private doctors in the emer-
gency department. One theory used in this setting is that of
corporate liability."" The hospital's liability under this theory is
not vicarious as when respondeat superior is applied.71 "Rather,
[liability] attaches directly to the corporation as a form of insti-
tutional or independent negligence." 72 Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial HospitaP3 is the most frequently cited
corporate liability case.
In Darling, an 18 year-old college football player suffered a
broken leg while playing in a game and was taken to the hos-
pital's emergency department. 74 The treating physician was a
private physician "on call" for the emergency department. 75 The
patient's treatment included application of a plaster cast and
hospitalization. 76 After several days, the patient was transferred
to another facility where he was treated by a specialist in or-
thopedic surgery. It was discovered that the fractured leg "con-
tained a considerable amount of dead tissue" due to improper
application of the cast by the initial treating physician. 77 Efforts
to save the leg were futile and it was eventually amputated just
below the knee. 7s
The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was negligent in failing
to oversee the actions of the treating physician. 79 The plaintiff
"Id.
See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
' See Southwick, supra note 19, at 17.
'n Id.
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
,4 Id. at 255.
" The defendant physician was placed on duty according to a roster developed by
the administration of the hospital. Id. at 256.
When the cast was being applied there were indications that the patient's
circulation was inhibited, including discoloration and numbness of the toes. Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
Id.
The plaintiff contended that the hospital was negligent in permitting the physi-
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also alleged that the hospital was liable for the negligent acts of
the emergency department nurses. 0 The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that a hospital could be held liable for the negligent
acts of a private physician if it "failed to review and monitor
treatment ... [provided by] the private physician and [if it]
failed to enforce the medical staff by-laws .. ."I Following the
Darling decision many jurisdictions recognized the use of cor-
porate liability. 82
The doctrine of ostensible agency is also recognized as an
effective method for imposing liability in this area. Although
private doctors function in various settings, hospitals most fre-
quently use private doctors to provide emergency care in small
rural communities where there is a shortage of emergency med-
icine trained physicians.83 Physician coverage for the emergency
department in rural hospitals typically is achieved through co-
ordination of hospital administration and the medical staff by
rotation of members of the hospital's medical staff.84
cian "to do orthopedic work of the kind required in this case, and not requiring him
to review his operative procedures to bring them up to date." Id. Thus, in failing to do
this through its medical staff, the hospital failed to exercise proper supervision over the
physician. Id.
' The court noted that "the jury could reasonably have concluded that the nurses
did not test for circulation as frequently as necessary [and] that skilled nurses would
have promptly recognized the conditions that signalled a dangerous impairment of
circulation in the leg." Id. at 258. Further, having noticed that complications had set
in, the nurses had the responsibility to report this to the attending physician. If he failed
to take any action then it was the nurses' responsibility to bring the matter to the
attention of higher authorities. Id. at 258.
sl Id.
82 See, e.g., Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Miseuch, 545 P.2d 958, 960 (Ariz.
1976); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 158-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982);
Buckley v. Lavallo, 481 A.2d 1286, 1289 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984); Mitchell County Hosp.
Authority v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ga. 1972); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d
543, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475, 484 (Mo. 1972);
Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); Felice
v. St. Agnes Hosp., 411 N.Y.S.2d 901, 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Bost v. Riley, 262
S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168-70 (Wash.
1984); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 170-75 (Wis. 1981).
'1 A Longitudinal Study of Residency-Trained Emergency Physicians, 12 ANNAis
OF EMERGENCY MED. 20 (Jan. 1983). A 1979 study indicated that only 7076 of graduating
residents trained in emergency medicine practiced in rural areas. Id. at 21.
'4 Hospital administrators often have responsibility for developing physician rosters
to ensure that there is adequate coverage for the emergency department. Prior to the
late 1970's when emergency medicine received recognition as a specialty area by the
American Board of Medical Specialties, there were two common modes of staffing the
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For example, in Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose,85 the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court held that "a hospital could be held liable
on principles of ostensible agency ... for the negligence of [a]
physician who furnished treatment to [a] patient in [the] emer-
gency room ... notwithstanding that [the] physician was not
actually employed by the hospital. '5 6 In this case the emergency
room physician failed to properly read X-rays of a 16 year-old
patient brought into the emergency room in an unconscious
state,87 resulting in the "failure to diagnose a skull fracture with
subdural hematoma." '5 The treating physician was a private
physician and not an employee of the hospital. She was a mem-
ber of the hospital medical staff and provided emergency room
coverage for the hospital on an "on call" basis.s9 Although her
medical specialty was obstetrics and gynecology, she was sum-
moned to treat the patient upon his arrival. 90 The treatment of
the patient by this physician was terminated upon payment for
treatment by the patient's parents and by hospitalization for
further observation. 9'
emergency department of a hospital. The Pontiac (Michigan) plan used staff physicians
regardless of their specialty. Physicians in this plan rotated several nights a month as
the "Emergency Department Physician" to provide coverage for the department. The
Alexandria (Virginia) plan utilized a group of physicians who chose to practice emergency
medicine. This group entered into a contract with the hospital to provide staffing for
the emergency department.
With emergency medicine becoming a specialty and board certification available,
hospitals have more frequently gone to the Alexandria plan with only some rural hospitals
continuing to utilize the Pontiac plan by necessity. In addition, resident physicians from
a variety of specialties may be hired by some hospitals as physician groups to "moonlight."
Only in a few New England hospitals and in some inner city hospitals are residents from
various specialties used to staff their emergency departments. This often occurs without
supervision by more senior resident staff or attending physicians in those specialties or an
attending emergency physician. Cooper Interview, supra note 9.
" 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985).
- Id. at 255.
'Id.
"[Wihen the parents of [the patient] arrived at the emergency room, the doctor
discussed the problem of a possible drug reaction or a head injury with them ..... Id.
at 256. Also at this time, arrangements were made for the patient to be admitted and
seen by a physician that could more appropriately address his needs. Id.
"Id.
In many hospitals emergency room coverage provided by a private physician
not trained in emergency medicine is not uncommon.
", These acts were focused upon as evidence that the parents did not believe that
the physician was an agent of the hospital. 683 S.W.2d at 256.
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This was a case of first impression for the Kentucky Supreme
Court. In a 1983 medical malpractice appellate decision, Williams
v. St. Claire Medical Center,92 the court recognized the principle
of ostensible agency and reversed a summary judgment in favor
of the hospital to allow a jury determination of negligence of a
third party.93 In Williams, the appellant argued that neither he nor
his parents relied on the fact that the physician was an employee
of the hospital in accepting treatment.94 The Paintsville Hospital
Co. court, addressing a similar argument, expounded the sound-
ness of the principle of ostensible agency as applied to situations
similar to the one at bar and stated:
[Tihe principle of ostensible agency [as applied] to the hospi-
tal/emergency room physician situation, do[es] not require an
express representation to the patient that the treating physician
is an employee of the hospital, nor do they require direct
testimony as to reliance. A general representation to the public
is implied from the circumstances. Without exception evidence
sufficient to invoke the doctrine has been inferred from cir-
cumstances similar to those shown in the present case, absent
evidence that the patient knew or should have known that the
treating physician was not a hospital employee when the treat-
ment was performed (not afterwards). 95
Therefore, specific representation to individuals that present
themselves to the emergency department is not required. A party
bringing an action can rely on the "general representation to the
public" when a hospital holds itself out as providing emergency
medical treatment. 96 Thus, the court concluded that "under these
circumstances, it is unreasonable to put a duty on the patient to
inquire of each person who treats him whether he is an employee
or independent contractor of the hospital. '97 The opinion further
657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
9 The hospital was held liable for the negligent acts of a nurse anesthetist even
though he was employed by Cave Run Clinic, a local professional service corporation.
Id. at 590.
9 Id.
91683 S.W.2d at 256.
9 Id.
" Id. at 258.
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stated that, "[indeed, it would be astonishing for courts to
require a patient to ask emergency room personnel such a ques-
tion considering the usual circumstances of the patient at the
time he seeks out the emergency room for treatment." 98 In
adopting the principle of ostensible agency, the court noted that
"the circumstances under which the hospital is liable are not
unlimited." 99 However, "where the public comes in expectation
of medical care to be provided through normal operating pro-
cedures within the hospital," application of ostensible agency
principles would be appropriate.'t 0
Given different factual circumstances, however, courts have
found it more difficult to hold a hospital liable for the negligence
of a private doctor. For example, in Weldon v. Seminole Mu-
nicipal Hospital,01 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that nei-
ther the theory of respondeat superior nor ostensible agency
extended to render a hospital liable for the negligence of a doctor
who was the primary medical care provider and was not paid a
salary by the hospital.10 2
The Weldon Court distinguished this case from a recent
Oklahoma.appellate decision, Smith v. St. Francis Hospital.13
In Smith, the hospital was estopped from denying responsibility
for the negligence of its emergency room physicians because the
hospital held itself out to the public as rendering medical care.,04
Therefore, patients seeking treatment from the hospital reason-
ably could be expected to rely on the hospital's representation
that the treating physicians were acting on behalf of the hospital.
Id.
SId.
Id.
709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985) In Weldon, the plaintiff brought a medical mal-
practice action against the hospital due to damage of her tympanic membrane which
resulted in a loss of hearing in her right ear. Id. at 1059.
113 The court stated:
[Biased on the facts before the trial court concerning the relationship
between the Hospital and Dr. Price, there is no genuine issue as to whether
the facts give rise to liability based on respondeat superior or ostensible
agency. It was proper for the trial court to resolve this issue by summary
judgment.
Id. at 1060.
,,, 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
4 Id. at 282.
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The Weldon Court noted that an important factor in estab-
lishing hospital liability based on ostensible agency was the pre-
existing doctor-patient relationship. 05 The court also recognized
that many jursidictions do not extend the theory of respondeat
superior to a hospital if the doctor exercises his own independent
judgment and is an independent contractor rather than an em-
ployee.10 6 Therefore, the Weldon court distinguished Smith pri-
marily on the basis of the Weldon patient's pre-existing doctor-
patient relationship.
The facts in Weldon indicated that the initial contact for
treatment of the patient was made by the patient's mother by
telephone to the physician at his residence.107 It was then ar-
ranged that the patient's treatment would take place at the
hospital. 03 Therefore, it is unlikely that the family was looking
to the hospital to provide medical care. The hospital was utilized
simply as a facility where the doctor, exercising his own inde-
pendent judgment, could render medical care. 09 Citing Smith,
the Weldon Court stated that the critical question is "whether
the plaintiff, at the time of his admission to the hospital, was
looking to the hospital for treatment of his physical ailments or
merely viewed the hospital as the situs where his physician could
treat him for his problems." 0 In Weldon, there appeared to be
little question that the hospital was simply a situs for treatment
and therefore liability based on respondeat superior or ostensible
agency could not be imposed."'
C. Hospital Liability for Contract Physicians
Over the past several decades, hospitals increasingly have
entered into contracts for services with various medical special-
"' 709 P.2d at 1060. The Smith court stated that notwithstanding the doctor's
status as an independent contractor, the hospital was estopped from denying liability
because the patient looked solely to the hospital to provide personnel and the patient
had no reason to believe that the physicians placed in the emergency room were acting
in their own behalf rather than in the hospital's. 676 P.2d at 282.
1 709 P.2d at 1061.
117 Id. at 1060.
103 Id.
109 Id.
"l The court felt that this question had to be resolved to invoke respondeat superior
or agency by estoppel as set forth by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. Id. at 1060.
11 Id.
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ists.112 Contractual provision for emergency medicine services
often is made. Hospital liability is more difficult to impose for
the acts of these non-employee physicians, as independent con-
tractors.'" Courts, however, "eventually extended the hospital's
liability to include those independent contractors whose in-house
functions subjected them to a significant degree of hospital
control and for whose services the hospital directly billed the
patients. ' '1 '4 The growing trend holding hospitals liable for the
negligent acts of emergency physicians, who have contractually
2 This is also true with respect to Emergency Medicine where the American College
of Emergency Physicians has set forth a position statement regarding contractual rela-
tionships between emergency physicians and hospitals. See Contractual Relationships
Between Emergency Physicians and Hospitals, 14 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 76 (1985).
Pertinent provisions include:
The American College of Emergency Physicians supports the follow-
ing general principles for contractual relationships between emergency phy-
sicians and hospitals:
I. Emergency physicians should not enter into an emergency service
arrangement with a hospital without a written contract.
2. A contract with an emergency physician or emergency physician
group should be fair to the parties involved, should be conducive to
excellence of medical care, and should promote the interests of the patients
and the community served by the hospital.
3. It is the right and privilege of emergency physicians to set fees for
their services.
4. The College recognizes that good medical care is being provided in
hospitals by physicians and under many forms of mutual agreement and
many methods of compensation, and accordingly does not endorse any
single type of contractual arrangement.
5. ACEP holds that physicians under contract should qualify for and
maintain medical staff membership and clinical privileges in the same
manner prescribed in the medical staff bylaws for other members of the
medical staff.
Id.
')' See Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Sanitarium for Negligence of Physician
or Surgeon, 69 A.L.R.2d 305, 315 (1960).
The general principle that the employer of an independent contractor
is not liable for the torts of such contractor or his servants has frequently
been recognized with respect to the liability of a hospital physician or
surgeon. In other words, putting aside the difficult question whether, under
particular circumstances, a particular medical practitioner was an inde-
pendent contractor so far as the hospital in which a patient was injured
through his carelessness is concerned, the conclusion that, assuming such
practitioner was an independent contractor in relation to the hospital, the
hospital is not liable for such injury, is supported by many decisions.
Id.
'" Note, supra note 39, at 122.
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agreed to provide service, is evident in a recent Mississippi
decision.
In Hardy v. Brantley,"5 the Mississippi Supreme Court de-
cided the question of whether a hospital, operating an emergency
department, may be held vicariously liable for the conduct of
emergency physicians retained under contract." 6 In this decision,
a medical malpractice action was brought against an emergency
service physician and the hospital for negligent failure to diag-
nose a perforated duodenal ulcer of a patient who came to the
emergency room for treatment." 7
The record in this case indicated that the treating physician
was one of three physicians organized as a group. Under an
elaborate contract with the hospital, these physicians were to
provide twenty-four hour coverage of the emergency depart-
ment."8 One of the provisions of the agreement was a disclaimer
clause which stated that, in the performance of their duties, the
emergency group was at all times an independent contractor." 9
The court noted that "the hospital and the emergency room
physicians ... are free to make as between themselves whatever
agreement they may desire.' ' 20 However, the court's concern
was with "the rights and duties of the hospital vis-a-vis the
patient, not the emergency room physician.''
"1 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985).
116 Id. at 371.
"7 Id. at 360.
I'8 The contract provides that HEG, the physician group, shall have the complete
and sole responsibility for furnishing professional services in the Emergency Department
of Hinds General Hospital on a twenty-four hour per day basis. Id. at 361.
119 Id.
Disclaimer. In this performance of the work, duties and obligation devolv-
ig upon him under this agreement, it is mutually understood and agreed that
The Hinds Emergency Group is at all times acting and performing as an in-
dependent contractor providing to the hospital the services of Emergency
Physicians who are practicing their profession in medicine and surgery and
specializing in Emergency care. The Hospital shall neither have nor exercise
any control or direction over the methods by which the Hinds Group or its
contract physicians shall perform their professional work and functions; the
sole interest and responsibility of the Hospital is to ensure that the Emergency
Department and service covered by this agreement shall be performed and
rendered in a competent, efficient, and satisfactory manner.
Id. (emphasis in original).
1I Id. at 369.
121 Id.
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Analyzing the legal obligation of the hospital to patients
treated in the emergency department, the court cited cases from
other jurisdictions, including Beeck v. Tucson General Hospi-
tal,'22 which have held hospitals vicariously liable for the negli-
gence or malpractice of staff physicians regardless of any contract
to the contrary.123 Also, the fact that the patient sought the
services of the hospital and not a particular physician was sig-
nificant. 124
Following what was characterized as a sound application of
general tort principles' 21 and ostensible agency principles,12 6 the
Hardy court found the hospital liable for the acts of an inde-
pendent contractor.
No longer are hospitals merely physical facilities where
physicians practice their professions. Hospitals hold themselves
out to the public as offering and rendering quality health care
services. We notice a marked increase in advertisement and
other forms of solicitations of patients as hospitals compete
for the health-care dollar.
It goes without saying that hospitals such as [the one here]
are corporate entities capable of acting only through human
beings whose services the hospital engages. In arrangements
such as the existing [one] ... the hospital places a great
portion of its eggs in the baskets of the emergency room
physicians. If they do their job well, the hospital succeeds in
500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
471 So. 2d at 369. See Brown v. Lasociet Francise de Bienfiasance Mutuelle, 71
P. 156 (Cal. 1903) (Agency was based on the patient seeking treatment from the hospital
as opposed to a particular doctor and the hospital paying the doctor a salary.); Kober
v. Stewart, 417 P.2d 476 (Mont. 1966) (Irrespective of a contractual arrangement, similar
to the one in Hardy, the Montana court held the hospital vicariously liable for the acts
of an X-ray technician.).
471 So. 2d at 369.
' The court cited REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 429 (1966) and stated:
One [Hinds General] who employs an independent contractor [Dr. Brantley
and his group] to perform services for another [Brad Ewing] which are
accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by
the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to
the same extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or
by his servants.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
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its chosen mission, profiting financially and otherwise from
the quality of emergency care so delivered. 27
The Hardy court recognized the changing nature of hospitals.
Increased competition in the hospital industry has resulted in
advertising to promote the use of specialty services such as the
emergency department. 12 At the same time, the treatment pro-
vided in this setting increasingly is contracted to groups of
physicians not employed by the hospital. Hospitals, such as the
one in Hardy, are promoting emergency care and seeking to
limit their liability to injured third parties through these con-
tractual agreements. Public policy clearly requires that hospitals
should be held accountable for acts of negligent physicians in
situations such as the one presented here.
III. TiE EFFECT ON HOSPITAL LIABILITY
Respondeat superior, ostensible agency, and corporate lia-
bility have been used by courts in various circumstances to hold
hospitals liable for the negligent acts of emergency room physi-
cians. Current case law has responded to the hospital industry
trend which reflects that most emergency care is provided by
private physicians or independent contractors. 129 As a result,
most jurisdictions have adopted either corporate liability or os-
tensible agency. Some cases have applied both theories in holding
a hospital liable. 130
In a recent decision, Hannola v. City of Lakewood,13 the
Ohio Court of Appeals indicated that a full service hospital
would be estopped from denying that on-duty medical personnel
were its agents. 32 Moreover, under corporate liability the hos-
pital had a direct and independent responsibility to its patients
127 Id.
128 Id.
I29 See generally, Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (private
doctor); Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth, 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (independent contractor physician); Arthur v. St. Peter's Hosp., 405 A.2d 443
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (independent contractor physician); Mbuda v. Benedic-
tine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (independent contractor physician).
110 See supra notes 34, 82.
131 426 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
I d. at 1190.
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to insure the competency of its medical staff and the quality of
medical care provided, through the prudent selection, review,
and continuing evaluation of the physicians granted staff privi-
leges. "3
The Hannola court further indicated that a hospital had an
independent "duty to prevent a physicians' malpractice at least
to the extent that it establishes procedures for the granting of
staff privileges and the review of these privileges." 13 4 The main
issue on appeal was "whether a hospital may insulate itself by
contractual arrangement from liability for acts of medical mal-
practice committed in an emergency room located on its prem-
ises.""' Public policy concerns regarding a patient's induced
reliance on the reputation of a full service hospital with an
emergency room were of particular importance. The court noted:
[G]iven the unique nature of an emergency room and the
public's lack of meaningful choice in a dire medical emergency,
a hospital may well have a more specific and precise inde-
pendent duty in the emergency room than in other parts of
the hospital to monitor the treatment procedures and medical
care provided patients. 36
It was also stressed that a hospital has a higher independent
duty of monitoring the patient care offered in its emergency
room. 3 7 Thus, this case indicates that in certain situations both
ostensible agency and corporate liability will be used to prevent
a hospital from escaping liability for the negligent acts of phy-
sicians functioning in the emergency department.
Although ostensible agency and corporate liability are com-
plementary and, therefore, are used concomitantly, there are
situations where one or the other would be more appropriate.
Close examination of Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose,' in
which ostensible agency was applied, provides a good example.
This case recognized that two conditions must be shown before
I' d. at 1192.
SId.
W Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1192.
,% Id.
683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985).
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liability can be imposed upon the basis of ostensible agency.
"First, the ostensible principal must have engaged in conduct of
such a nature as to cause a reasonable person to believe that an
agency relationship existed, although actually there was no
agency. 139 Secondly, the person seeking to impose liability upon
one who is ostensibly a principal for the tort of one who is
ostensibly, but not actually, an agent must in fact believe that
an agency relationship did exist and must act in reliance upon
that belief."' 40
In Rose, the patient was brought to the hospital in an un-
conscious state. Therefore, it is questionable whether the de-
ceased, upon his admission to the hospital, did "rely upon a
belief that the emergency room physician was, in fact, an agent
of the hospital.' ' 14 1 Moreover, the parents of the deceased were
told by the defendant physician that the deceased's injuries were
beyond her expertise and that she could not offer further treat-
ment.142 Given this information it is unlikely that either the
deceased or his parents believed that an agency relationship
existed between the hospital and the physician. Therefore, osten-
sible agency may not have been the appropriate theory to hold
the hospital liable.
Following the well-established case law set forth in Darling'43
and its progeny, however, the Rose court possibly could have
found the hospital liable under the corporate liability theory.
Some courts believe that this theory is applied appropriately in
situations where the malpractice charges made against the hos-
pital were for a physician or staff engaged in private practice
"I Id. at 258 (Vance, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion asserted that this may
not be the proper case for using ostensible agency and that summary judgment should
be granted. This in part was due to the difficulty in finding that the conditions precedent
were met. Id.
,40 Id. (Vance, J., dissenting).
'l Id. at 259 (Vance, J., dissenting). (This issue will undoubtedly be a reoccuring prob-
lem because in many instances patients are brought to the emergency room in an unconscious
state.)
142 When the physician explained to the parents of the deceased that the patient's
injuries were outside of her area of expertise, she also indicated that another physician
would treat the patient once he was admitted. Moreover, the parents paid the physician
at this time. These facts raise serious doubt as to whether the parents believed that the
physician was employed by the hospital. Id. at 259-260 (vance, J., dissenting).
",3 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (IlL. 1965).
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and otherwise wholly separate and apart from the hospital.'"4
Corporate liability is premised on the notion that a hospital owes
a duty directly to its patients to render quality medical care and
also to protect its patients' safety.Y4 5 There is a further duty to
protect patients from negligent or incompetent treatment. 146 A
hospital could be held liable, therefore, when hospital by laws
or protocol are breached.
CONCLUSION
In the past several decades the courts have made significant
progress in adjusting to the rapidly changing health care indus-
try. The role of the hospital has changed as significantly as any
element in the industry. The recognition of the hospital as more
than a building where physicians treat their patients was an
important first step in properly evaluating and allocating re-
sponsibility for negligent acts of medical care providers. The use
of corporate liability and ostensible agency has filled the gaps
left by the traditional theory of respondeat superior. Further
progress needs to be made to ensure that the public is fully
protected and that providers of poor quality health services
remain fully liable for their services.
Keith B. Hunter
- See Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 n.6 (Miss. 1985).
- Note, supra note 39, at 125.
I" Id.
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